

## Message Text

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USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047705

VIENNA FOR MBFR REP

FOLLOWING SENT GENEVA BONN LONDON MOSCOW PARIS TOKYO  
HONGKONG USUNNY IAEA VIENNA NATO MARCH 15, FROM SECSTATE  
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 047705

DISTO

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, UR, CH

SUBJ: SOV DEL' S REQUEST FOR TALKS ON PROBLEM OF PARTICIPA-  
TION IN ANY CTB

REF: GENEVA 798

1. US DEL SHOULD BE GUIDED BY FOLLOWING GENERAL CONSIDERA-  
TIONS IN ITS DISCUSSIONS OF THIS SUBJECT WITH SOVIET DEL,  
AS WELL AS US ALLIES AND OTHERS ( SPECIFIC POINTS ARE SET  
FORTH IN SECOND HALF OF THIS MESSAGE):

A. WE WISH TO AVOID ASSISTING SOVS IN ANY WAY IN  
WHAT MAY BE EFFORT TO BUILD CASE THAT PRC IS RESPONSIBLE  
FOR LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS CTB. IN EVENT SOVIETS TRY  
AT NEXT UNGA TO BLAME LACK OF CTB PROGRESS ON CHINESE,  
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AS UK DEL HAS SPECULATED ( GENEVA 919), IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT NEITHER SOVIETS NOR ANYONE ELSE BE ABLE TO SAY THAT US ENCOURAGED, AIDED, OR EVEN ACQUIESCED IN SUCH SOVIET MANEUVER.

B. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OUR RESPONSE TO SOVIETS NOT

BE PORTRAYABLE AS " PLOTTING OR CONSPIRING" WITH SOVIETS ABOUT CHINESE DISARMAMENT POLICIES OR INTERESTS.

C. IF WE FAILED TO RESPOND TO SOVIET REQUEST FOR CONVERSATIONS THIS WOULD PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR SOVIETS, AS WELL AS POSSIBLY OTHERS, TO SAY EITHER OR BOTH OF FOLLOWING: FIRST, US WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED IN ACHIEVEMENT OF CTB TO RESPOND TO REQUEST FOR CONVERSATIONS ON AN IMPORTANT CTB ISSUE; SECOND, US CAN BE PRESUMED TO BE SATISFIED WITH MOST RECENT SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENT ON PARTICIPATION OF NUCLEAR POWERS IN CTB ( WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS TENDING TO PUT BLAME FOR NO PROGRESS ON PRC) SINCE OTHERWISE US WOULD HAVE TAKEN UP WITH SOVIET DEL ITS SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER TALKS ON MATTER.

D. WE WISH TO AVOID GIVING OTHERS, AND ESPECIALLY OUR ALLIES, ANY GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT SPECIAL BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN US AND USSR ARE STARTING IN ORDER TO RESOLVE KEY TEST BAN ISSUES.

E. WE WISH TO AVOID TAKING ANY POSITIONS IN CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIETS WHICH WOULD FORECLOSE POLICY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO USG IN CONNECTION WITH OVERALL CTB ISSUE.

2. US DEL IS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEL:

A. US DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO RESPOND TO SOVIET DELEGATION' S REQUEST FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON POINT RAISED BY SOVIET DELEGATION, NAMELY, WHAT SHOULD BE POSITION WITH RESPECT TO MANDATORY PARTIES FOR A CTB;  
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HOWEVER, US DEL BELIEVES THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR

SPECIAL, SEPARATE TALKS ON THIS QUESTION AND THAT FURTHER CONVERSATIONS CAN AND SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN COURSE OF NORMAL EXCHANGES AT REGULAR CO- CHAIRMEN MEETINGS.

B. US POSITION ON QUESTION OF MANDATORY PARTIES FOR A CTB REMAINS, AS US DEL HAS ALREADY INFORMED SOV DEL, THAT " PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS IN AN AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED BY THE US TO BE A PREREQUISITE TO A CTB." WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE OR DESIRABLE TO ADOPT ANY MORE DETAILED OR FAR- REACHING POSITION AT THIS TIME.

C. THIS POSITION PERMITS SERIOUS WORK TO CONTINUE ON OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES RELATING TO TEST BAN. PROGRESS WILL, IN FACT, HAVE TO BE MADE ON THEM BEFORE A CTB CAN BE REALIZED. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT VERIFICATION QUESTION, ON WHICH US AND USSR CONTINUE TO HAVE BASIC DIFFERENCES, CLEARLY WARRANTS FURTHER WORK AND HAVE, OURSELVES , CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANT MATERIAL IN FORM OF US WORKING PAPER OF LAST AUGUST ON SEISMIC VERIFICATION.

D. WE HAVE NOTED THAT SOVIET DEL HAS INFORMED US THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO DETERMINATION THAT PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS IS PRECONDITION FOR CTB ( GENEVA 798 AND 854). FOR REASON STATED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE THIS IS APPROPRIATE POSITION GIVEN CURRENT STATUS OF CTB DELIBERATIONS AND, THEREFORE, WE WOULD HOPE THAT USSR WOULD CONTINUE IN THIS POSITION. SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 20, HOWEVER , HAS CREATED SOME QUESTION AMONG MANY DELS WHETHER, IN FACT, THIS IS SOVIET POSITION. WE WOULD HOPE THAT SOVIET DEL COULD CLARIFY IN RESPONSE TO INTEREST OF JAPANESE, NETHERLANDS AND OTHERS THAT POSITION IT STATED TO US AT FEBRUARY 19 CO- CHAIRMAN MEETING ( SIMILAR TO THAT IN SUB PARA B ABOVE) DOES REMAIN SOVIET POSITION.

E. IF SOVIET DEL HAS FURTHER COMMENTS TO MAKE PERTAINING TO REMARKS OF SOVIET CO- CHAIRMAN ABOUT RELATIONSHIP OF QUESTION OF MANDATORY PARTIES TO QUESTION OF CONFIDENTIAL

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SCOPE ( PARTIAL OR COMPLETE) OF AN UNDERGROUND TEST BAN, WE WILL BE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING THESE AND WILL CONSIDER WHETHER WE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS TO MAKE ABOUT THESE FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS.

F. SOV DEL SHOULD KNOW THAT US DEL HAS, PURSUANT TO CUSTOMARY PRACTICE, DISCUSSED WITH ITS ALLIES THE ABOVE POINTS AND WILL, AS IS NORMAL, CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH ITS ALLIES ABOUT US- SOVIET EXCHANGES ON THIS MATTER. WE, OF COURSE, ASSUME THAT SOVIETS WILL CONSULT THEIR ALLIES IN NORMAL FASHION.

3. BEFORE CONVEYING RESPONSE TO SOVIETS, US DEL SHOULD INFORM DELS OF NATO ALLIES AND JAPAN AT WESTERN GROUP

MEETING OF RESPONSEWE PLAN TO MAKE. WE APPRECIATE GREAT INTEREST OUR ALLIES HAVE IN THIS MATTER AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD DISCUSSION WITH ALLIES REVEAL, IN US DEL' S JUDGMENT, ANY ELEMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE MODIFIED OR ADDED IN US RESPONSE TO SOVIETS, IT SHOULD REPORT THOSE PROMPTLY FOR OUR CONSIDERATION PRIOR TO MEETING WITH SOVIETS. US DEL SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, GIVE ALLIES IMPRESSION THAT US IS SOLICITING SUGGESTIONS FROM ALLIES FOR MODIFICATIONS IN ITS PLANNED RESPONSE TO SOVIETS. ROGERS UNQUOTE ROGERS

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